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Abstract
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) has been widely used to investigate the perception of the
bodily self. Commonly used measures of the illusion are self-report questionnaires and pro-
prioceptive drift of the participants’ hands towards the rubber hand. Recent studies have
shown that these measures can be dissociated, suggesting they may arise from distinct
mechanisms. In previous studies using questionnaires, participants were asked to base
responses on their subjective feelings of body ownership, rather than their beliefs. This
makes sense given the obvious fact that whereas participants may feel like the rubber hand
is part of their body, they do not believe that it is. It is not clear, however, whether a similar
dissociation between feelings and beliefs also exists for proprioceptive drift. Here, we inves-
tigated the presence of a dissociation between feeling and belief in the context of the RHI.
When participants reported their feelings there was an increase both in the sense of body
ownership over the fake hand as well as in the proprioceptive drift, compared to when they
reported their beliefs. Strikingly, unlike the sense of ownership, proprioceptive drift was
unaffected by the synchrony of stimulation. This may be an important way in which the two
measures of the RHI differ.
Introduction
The way we represent our body strongly relies on the integration of information from different
sensory modalities [1]. A classic example of this type of integration is the Rubber Hand Illusion
(RHI) [2]. In this paradigm, participants observe a rubber hand being stroked while their
unseen real hand is synchronously touched. After synchronous stimulation, participants tend
to perceive the location of their own occluded hand misplaced toward the rubber hand [3].
Moreover, they report feeling the tactile sensation originating from the rubber hand, as if they
could experience touch through it [4], which sometime results in a feeling of ownership over
the fake hand [5].
While a range of measures have been used to quantify the illusion, the two most widely
used are a questionnaire assessing the subjective experience of the illusion, and proprioceptive
misplacement of the participants’ own hand towards the rubber hand, which is typically con-
sidered as more objective and resistant to demand characteristics. Early work suggested that
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these two measures reflect a common underlying mechanism [2]. More recently, however,
some studies in healthy individuals [6,7] and patients [8] have shown that they can be dissoci-
ated, suggesting that they may arise from different underlying processes [9].
Here, we consider an aspect of the RHI which has not been a focus of research, namely the
obvious fact that while participants report feeling like the rubber hand is part of their body,
they do not believe that it really is. There is a rubber hand illusion, and not a rubber hand delu-
sion. Accordingly, questionnaires assessing the subjective experience of the illusion have natu-
rally used ‘apparent’ phrasing, asking participants about what it “felt like” during the illusion,
rather than what they “really thought” was happening [2,5]. Interestingly, it is not obvious
whether there is an analogous dissociation between feeling and belief in the proprioceptive
drift induced by the illusion. Participants may be genuinely fooled about the location of their
hand, in a way that they are not fooled about the attribution of ownership over the rubber
hand. Indeed, studies have been inconsistent in their phrasing to participants about proprio-
ceptive localisation. For example, Tsakiris and Haggard [3], asked participants “Where is your
index finger?”, a phrasing which suggests a judgment of where the finger actually is. In con-
trast, Longo and colleagues [5] asked participants to judge “where it felt like the tip of their
index finger was located”. No studies have compared these types of instructions, making it
unclear whether there is a dissociation between feeling and belief for proprioceptive drift, as
there obviously is for the subjective experience of body ownership. Consequently, the dissocia-
tion between the drift and questionnaire measures may tap into different constructs that are
differently affected by instructions. This may be an important way in which these measures
differ, perhaps accounting for lack of correlation between the feeling of ownership and propri-
oceptive drift [7].
A few studies have investigated the potential dissociation between feeling and belief in the
context of body perception. Ekroll and colleagues [10], using a visuo-proprioceptive illusion
(the ‘shrunken finger illusion’), found that participants’ finger length underestimation was
about four times larger when asked about their feeling rather than their belief. Hence, Ekroll
and colleagues suggested that the illusory experience of a ‘shrunk’ finger maybe based on per-
ceptual rather than cognitive processing. Yet, this dissociation is not always present. Tamè and
colleagues [11] found no influence of instruction when studying several types of distorted
body representations. However, these distortions were pre-existing and intrinsic to the body
rather than needing to be elicited using a manipulation as in the shrunken finger illusion.
Thus, it remains unclear whether instructions about feelings rather than beliefs in the context
of a RHI paradigm, can affect proprioceptive localization. This provides a potentially novel
way of dissociating the underlying mechanisms producing these aspects of the RHI; partici-
pants may be genuinely deluded about the location of the finger, while being merely illuded
about the experience of body ownership. Hence, the current study investigated dissociation
between feeling and belief instructions in the RHI. We used a standard RHI paradigm measur-
ing subjective reports and proprioceptive drift, but asked participants to adopt different atti-
tudes towards their judgments.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty people (M ± SD = 28.5 ± 6.9 years; 13 females) participated. Participants gave
informed consent and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and touch. The study
was performed in accordance to the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Departmen-
tal Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, Univer-
sity of London. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. Seventeen
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participants were right-hand, as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (M = 65,
range -100-100, [12]).
Design
The experiment had a repeated-measures design with two factors: INSTRUCTION (Feeling, Belief)
and STIMULATION (Synchronous, Asynchronous). The four blocks were randomised and
repeated three times with a different order, resulting in twelve blocks overall.
Procedure
The participant was seated at a table opposite the experimenter, with their left arm placed
through an entrance hole and resting in a specially constructed box (75 cm x 59 cm x 17 cm;
see Fig 1). A life-size model of a left hand and forearm was placed in the box, aligned with the
participant’s body midline. The participant could see this fake hand through a window in the
box. The box had a hinged cover which when lifted exposed the fake hand and hid the
Rubber Hand
Actual Hand
Paint brushes
Fig 1. Experimental set-up for the rubber hand illusion.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206367.g001
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experimenter from view. Participants wore a cloth smock that was attached to the front of the
box and hid their real arm from view. The distance between the participant’s index finger and
the index finger of the fake hand was 22 cm. The back of the box was removed to allow the
experimenter to access the participant’s hand and the fake hand.
Two visuotactile induction conditions, synchronous and asynchronous, were performed.
At the beginning of each trial, the cover of the box was raised and the participant was
instructed to focus on the rubber hand while two paintbrushes stroked the index fingers of the
fake hand and the participant’s real hand for 60 s at approximately 1 stroke/s. In the synchro-
nous condition, the timing of the brush strokes was synchronized, whereas in the asynchro-
nous condition the timing of the brush strokes was 180˚ out of phase. Before each trial, two
finger location judgements were obtained by placing a ruler across the top of the box and ask-
ing participants to indicate where they felt/believed, depending on the condition, the tip of
their left index finger was located. The placement of this ruler varied from trial to trial to pre-
vent participants repeating responses in subsequent trials. After stimulation, the box cover was
lowered and two post-induction finger location judgements were obtained in the same manner
as before the induction.
In different blocks, the experimenter asked participants to adopt different approaches to
the task. At the beginning of the study, the following description of the two approaches was
given:
“In different blocks of trials, I’ll ask you to adopt different approaches to the task both for the
localization of your finger and the questionnaire. On some blocks, I’ll ask you to judge the
location where it FEELS like your left index finger is located and to respond to the question-
naire according to your subjective experience. In this case, we’re interested in your subjective
experience of the location of your finger and subjective percept. On other blocks, I’ll ask you to
judge the location where you think your left index finger REALLY IS and to respond to the
questionnaire according to your objective beliefs. In this case, we’re interested in your objective
beliefs about the location of your finger and objective percept.”
Fig 2 shows a short questionnaire that was administered verbally after each trial to assess
the participant’s feeling or belief experience. Items in the questionnaire were slightly different
depending of the instruction condition. The questionnaire consists of 3 items, two of interest
and a third as a control for demand characteristics. Participants rated their agreement on a
scale ranging from 0 (completely disagree) to 10 (completely agree).
Data analysis
Finger location judgement was calculated as the difference between the position reported by
the participant and the actual position of the participant’s finger. A positive value indicates a
judgement to the right of a participant’s actual finger location (i.e. towards the fake hand) and
a negative value indicates a judgement to the left of the actual finger location (i.e. away from
the fake hand). Proprioceptive drift was calculated by subtracting the pre-induction finger
location judgement from the post-induction finger location judgement. The proprioceptive
drift values were entered into a repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with
INSTRUCTION (Apparent, Objective) and STIMULATION (Synchronous, Asynchronous) as within-
participant factors. Moreover, values from the questionnaire for each question were entered
into three separate ANOVAs with the same factors, specifically instruction and stimulation.
Two-tailed paired t-tests were used for all planned comparisons. The raw data are publicly
available at https://osf.io/9kw2c/.
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Results
Questionnaire
For question 1 (touch), an ANOVA revealed significant main effects of INSTRUCTION, F(1,19) =
47.34, p = .0001, MSE = 2.01, ηp2 = .71, and STIMULATION, F(1,19) = 31.96, p = .0001, MSE =
6.77, ηp
2 = .63, which were modified by an interaction, F(1,19) = 6.12, p = .023, MSE = 2.54,
0 10
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Completely
Agree
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[I felt as if/I believed that] the touch was caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand
Feeling
Belief
[I felt like/I believed that] the rubber hand was my hand
0 10
Completely
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Completely
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[I felt as if/I believed that] my (real) hand was turning rubbery
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Fig 2. Questionnaire administered to participants after each trial. On each question, participants were allowed to give any number between minimum
level and maximum level [5]. Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean (±SEM).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206367.g002
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ηp
2 = .24. Participants more strongly agreed with the statement with the feeling instruction
when they were stimulated synchronously (M±SE = 6.1±0.6) compared to asynchronously (M
±SE = 1.9±0.5; t(19) = 5.40, p = 0.0001, dz = 1.21). This dissociation was present also when they
were performing the task under the belief instruction, however, it was less prominent (t(19) =
4.20, p = 0.001, dz = 0.93). As expected this result shows a dissociation between the synchro-
nous and asynchronous conditions, more interestingly, it shows a dissociation between the
types of instruction adopted.
An ANOVA on the data for the question 2 revealed significant main effects of INSTRUCTION,
F(1,19) = 32.67, p = .0001, MSE = 3.77, ηp2 = .63, and STIMULATION, F(1,19) = 55.77, p = .0001,
MSE = 1.87, ηp2 = .75, which were subsidiary to an interaction, F(1,19) = 15.61, p = .001,
MSE = 1.36, ηp2 = .45. As for the previous item, participants more strongly agreed with the
statement with instruction about their feeling when they were stimulated synchronously
(M±SE = 5.8±0.5) compared to asynchronously (M±SE = 2.5±0.6; t(19) = 6.55, p = .0001, dz =
1.46). This dissociation was present also when they were performing the task with instruction
about their belief, however, it was less prominent (t(19) = 4.83, p = .0001, dz = 1.10).
Finally, as shown in bottom of Fig 2 an ANOVA on the participants’ rating for question 3
revealed a significant main effect of INSTRUCTION, F(1,19) = 7.44, p = .013, MSE = 3.26, ηp2 = .28,
caused by the fact that participants more strongly agreed with the items in the feeling (M±SE =
2.2±0.5) compared to the belief (M±SE = 1.1±0.3) instruction. Moreover, there was also a sig-
nificant main effect of STIMULATION, F(1,19) = 9.98, p = .005, MSE = 1.98, ηp2 = .34, caused by
the fact that participants more strongly agreed with the item in the synchronous (M±SE = 2.1
±0.5) compared to the asynchronous (M±SE = 1.1±0.3) stimulation condition. However, the
interaction between INSTRUCTION and STIMULATION was only marginally significant, F(1,19) =
3.99, p = .06, MSE = 1.24, ηp2 = .17.
Overall, these results indicate that there were significant differences in the perceived illusion
strength between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Critically, this difference was
more prominent when participants were instructed to respond about their feeling than their
belief.
Proprioceptive drift
An ANOVA on the drift measurement revealed a significant main effect of INSTRUCTION,
F(1,19) = 14.77, p = .001, MSE = 4.28, ηp2 = .44. As shown in Fig 3, participants had a greater pro-
prioceptive drift towards the rubber hand when instructed to respond about their feeling (M±SE =
2.3±0.6cm) compared to their belief (M±SE = 0.6±0.3cm), see Fig 3. Moreover, there was a main
effect of STIMULATION, F(1,19) = 10.58, p = .004, MSE = 6.79, ηp2 = .36, caused by a greater proprio-
ceptive drift for the synchronous (M±SE = 2.4±0.6cm) compared to the asynchronous (M±SE =
0.5±0.3cm) stimulation condition. However, in contrast to the questionnaire, there was no signifi-
cant interaction between these two factors, F(1,19) = 1.32, p = .27, MSE = 1.01, ηp2 = .07.
Discussion
Here, we aimed to investigate the potential dissociation between participants’ feeling and belief
in the context of the RHI. We were particularly interested if such a dissociation was present for
the proprioceptive drift measure. We replicated the classic results in the RHI literature in
which participants experience a stronger illusion when they are stimulated synchronously than
asynchronously in both measures, supporting the suitability of our approach. Our main find-
ing is that when participants are asked to report their feelings they report having a stronger illu-
sion compared to when they are asked to report their beliefs, as shown by a greater sense of
body ownership and–more critically–by a larger proprioceptive drift.
Rubber hand illusion and instruction
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For the proprioceptive drift measure, we did not find an interaction between instruction
and stimulation conditions. Hence, when participants were looking at the rubber hand they
may have been more genuinely fooled about the location of their real hand when asked to
respond about their feeling than their belief regardless of the fact that stimulation was synchro-
nous or asynchronous. This is an interesting effect considering that typically the asynchronous
stimulation is not meant to induce the illusion of experiencing the rubber hand as your own
and is apparent also in a reduced proprioceptive drift and questionnaire compared to the syn-
chronous stimulation. A possible reason for this pattern of results is that participants were
experiencing the illusion merely by seeing the rubber hand while their own hand was hidden.
It has been previously shown that vision itself can induce a proprioceptive drifts comparable to
the synchronous stimulation condition [7,13]. Our effects for proprioceptive drift could result
from the possibility that when participants responded about their feeling, they may have
reduced their “rational” resistance to the illusion. This process probably occurs before partici-
pants are stimulated, as a mental state that is carried on during the synchronous and asynchro-
nous stroking. Therefore, the participants’ attitude to respond, about their feeling or belief,
Fig 3. Mean proprioceptive drift towards the rubber hand for the synchronous and asynchronous stimulation in the Feeling and Belief instruction
conditions. Error bars represent 95% within-subjects Confidence Intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206367.g003
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when somehow set a priori at the beginning of the block is then maintained across trials unaf-
fected by the type of stimulation. In this respect, Rohde and colleagues [7], have shown that
with frequent measurements the proprioceptive drift occurs not only in the synchronous con-
dition, but also with asynchronous stroking and when just vision of the hand is present with-
out any stroking. On the basis of their data, authors suggested that prolonged synchronous
stroking causes a proprioceptive drift in the RHI, however, this drift is already present before
the stroking is applied. By contrast, the prolonged asynchronous stroking is interfering with
the proprioceptive drift by interfering with the visuo-proprioceptive integration of the visual
location of the rubber hand and the proprioceptive signal coming from the real hand.
Interestingly, the proprioceptive drift was influenced by instruction type. Drift reduced
when participants were instructed to indicate where they believed their hand to be located as
opposing to where they felt their hand be located. Indeed, the magnitude of the drift in the feel
asynchronous condition was the same as the magnitude of the drift in the synchronous belief con-
dition. If proprioceptive drift can be influenced by the attitudes of the participant, then the experi-
mental hypothesis may not be as opaque to participants as commonly thought [7,14]. If drift is
not an objective measure, then it is unclear what proprioceptive drift is actually measuring and
how it is different from subjective reports. It could very well be that the drift measure is not actu-
ally a measure of the illusion, but rather a result of demand. It would be interesting to see if the
physiological measures associated with the illusion, which are also considered objective, such as
skin temperature and galvanic skin response could be modulated by experimental instructions.
As shown by the interaction of the questionnaires’ rating between stimulation (i.e., syn-
chronous and asynchronous) and type of instructions, the sense of body ownership was signifi-
cantly stronger when participants judged their feelings than their beliefs (i.e., items 1 and 2 of
the illusion questionnaire). This result is an important sanity check, since while healthy partici-
pants report feeling like the rubber hand is part of their body, they obviously do not believe
that it really is.
We have shown that the two classical measures of the RHI (i.e., sense of body ownership vs
reallocation of the limb) differ if participants are asked to respond about their feelings versus
their beliefs. These results demonstrate that, in the context of the RHI, how instructions pro-
vided by the experimenter, are phrased can significantly bias participants’ responses, that in
the present context is reflected in changes in experience body ownership and in turn the
embodiment of a rubber hand. These results speak in favour of two different underlying pro-
cesses for the sense of ownership and the shift in the perceived location of the limb. Previous
studies have shown that the sense of ownership and the perceived reallocation of the limb
towards the rubber hand are served by different neural mechanisms. For instance, Ehrsson
and colleagues [15] proposed that the sense of ownership is mediated by the premotor cortex,
whereas a reaching circuit is responsible for the recalibration of the limb position representa-
tions. Moreover, a third mechanism responsible for the multisensory integration has been also
suggested to underlie this illusion [15]. Our research further supports the idea of the absence
of a direct causal link between the sense of body ownership and the proprioceptive drift [7,16].
Importantly, our research also emphasises that the experimenter phrasing to participants
when asking about their experience of the illusion should be taken into account in the design
and data analyses of all relevant future studies that use the RHI paradigm.
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